An Extensive Systematic Review on Model-Driven Development of Secure Systems by Nguyen, Phu Hong
 An Extensive Systematic Review on Model-
Driven Development of Secure Systems 
 
Phu Hong Nguyen, SnT, University of Luxembourg 
Max Kramer, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (Germany) 
Jacques Klein, SnT, University of Luxembourg 
Yves Le Traon, SnT, University of Luxembourg 
14 April 2015 
ISBN 978-2-87971-139-3/TR-SnT-2015-2 
 
 
 
 
An Extensive Systematic Review on Model-Driven
Development of Secure Systems
Phu H. Nguyen∗, Max Kramer†, Jacques Klein∗ and Yves Le Traon∗
∗Interdisciplinary Center for Security, Reliability and Trust (SnT)
University of Luxembourg, 4 rue Alphonse Weicker, L-2721 Luxembourg
Email: (phuhong.nguyen, jacques.klein, yves.letraon)@uni.lu
†Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
Am Fasanengarten 5, D-76131 Karlsruhe, Germany
Email: max.e.kramer@kit.edu
Abstract—Context: Model-Driven Security (MDS) is as a spe-
cialised Model-Driven Engineering research area for supporting
the development of secure systems. Over a decade of research on
MDS has resulted in a large number of publications.
Objective: To provide a detailed analysis of the state of the art
in MDS, a systematic literature review (SLR) is essential.
Method: We conducted an extensive SLR on MDS. Derived
from our research questions, we designed a rigorous, extensive
search and selection process to identify a set of primary MDS
studies that is as complete as possible. Our three-pronged
search process consists of automatic searching, manual searching,
and snowballing. After discovering and considering more than
thousand relevant papers, we identified, strictly selected, and
reviewed 108 MDS publications.
Results: The results of our SLR show the overall status of
the key artefacts of MDS, and the identified primary MDS
studies. E.g. regarding security modelling artefact, we found that
developing domain-specific languages plays a key role in many
MDS approaches. The current limitations in each MDS artefact
are pointed out and corresponding potential research directions
are suggested. Moreover, we categorise the identified primary
MDS studies into 5 principal MDS studies, and other emerging
or less common MDS studies. Finally, some trend analyses of
MDS research are given.
Conclusion: Our results suggest the need for addressing multiple
security concerns more systematically and simultaneously, for
tool chains supporting the MDS development cycle, and for more
empirical studies on the application of MDS methodologies. To
the best of our knowledge, this SLR is the first in the field of
Software Engineering that combines a snowballing strategy with
database searching. This combination has delivered an extensive
literature study on MDS.
I. Introduction
With more and more IT systems being developed and
used, approaches for systematically engineering secure IT
systems are becoming increasingly important. Model-Driven
Security (MDS) emerged more than a decade ago as a special
area of Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) for supporting the
development of secure systems. MDE has been considered
by some researchers as a solution to handle complex and
evolving software systems [22]. It leverages models and
transformations as main artefacts at every development stage.
MDS specialises MDE by taking security requirements and
functional requirements into account at every stage of the
development process. By modelling and manipulating models,
the level of abstraction is higher than code-level that brings
several significant benefits, especially regarding security en-
gineering. First, security concerns can be considered together
with business logic and other quality requirements such as per-
formance from the very beginning, and throughout the MDS
development life cycle. Second, reasoning about systems at the
model level, e.g. with model-based verification and validation
methods, makes it possible to check security requirements and
other requirements at early design stages. These methods can
perform formal verification as well as security testing based
on models. Moreover, models that abstract away from target
platform details can increase cross-platform interoperability.
Third, MDS can be more productive, and supposedly less
error-prone than traditional development methods by leverag-
ing automated model-to-model transformations (MMTs) and
model-to-text transformations (MTTs, code generation).
For more than a decade since MDS first appeared, a
considerable number of MDS publications has shown a great
attention of the research community to this area. The MDS
approaches vary greatly in many artefacts such as the security
concerns addressed, the modeling techniques used, the model
transformations techniques used, the targeted application do-
mains, or the evaluation methods used. To provide a detailed
state of the art in MDS, a full systematic literature review
(SLR) is needed.
So far, a full SLR on MDS does not exist. Surveys on MDS
approaches ([13, 71, 79, 121]) could provide in-depth analyses
of some well-known MDS approaches, but do not summarize
the complete research area systematically. [62] could be closer
to our work, but has several limitations in terms of scope
and methodology. E.g., it missed many important primary
MDS approaches such as UMLsec [65], and aspect-oriented
approaches. In contrast, our SLR is performed in both width
and depth of MDS research that reveals an extensive set of
primary MDS studies. Furthermore, our review provides a
detailed overview on key artefacts of every MDS approach
such as used modeling techniques, considered security con-
cerns, employment of model transformations, verification or
validation methods, and targeted application domains. Finally,
we present trend analyses for MDS publications, and for the
addressed security concerns and other key artefacts.
This paper is an extended and improved version of [101]. In
the previous version, we reported the results of a SLR based on
80 MDS papers found from an automatic search and a rigorous
selection process. In this extended version, we improved our
set of primary MDS papers by conducting two more search
strategies: manual search and snowballing. On the resulting
set of 108 finally selected MDS papers, we performed more
detailed analyses for key artefacts, primary MDS studies, and
trend analyses for a period of more than a decade.
The main contributions of this paper are: 1) detailed and
condensed results on key MDS artefacts of all identified
primary MDS publications; 2) a diagnosis of limitations of
current MDS approaches with suggestions for potential MDS
research directions; 3) a classification of principal and emerg-
ing/less common MDS approaches; and 4) trend analyses.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section
II provides some main background concepts and definitions
that are used in this paper. The objective of this SLR, its
research questions, search strategy, and selection process are
described in Section III. In Section IV, we present our evalua-
tion criteria and data extraction strategy. Section V shows the
main results of our review. Threats to validity are discussed in
Section VI. In Section VIIs, we position this work regarding
related work. Section VIII concludes the paper by summarising
the results, highlighting open issues, and giving some thoughts
on future work.
II. Background Concepts and Definitions
A. Systematic Literature Review and Snowballing
SLR is a means for thoroughly answering a particular
research question, or examining a particular research topic
area, or phenomenon of interest, by systematically identifying,
evaluating, and interpreting all available relevant research [77].
Well-known guidelines for conducting SLRs in software en-
gineering were provided by Kitchenham [77] and Biolchini
et al. [23]. All individual studies that are identified as relevant
research contributing to a SLR are called primary studies
[77]. In this paper, based on the numbers of publications and
citations of primary MDS studies, we further classify them
into principal MDS studies, and less common or emerging
MDS studies.
In a SLR, it is crucial to transparently and correctly identify
as many relevant research papers in the focus of the review
as possible. The search strategy is key to the identification of
primary studies and ultimately to the actual outcome of the
review [128]. The guidelines by Kitchenham [77] for SLRs in
software engineering suggest to start with a database search
that is based on a search string and also called automatic
search in this paper. They also recommend complementary
searches, e.g. a manual search on journals and conferences
proceedings, references lists, and publications lists of re-
searchers in the field.
Both automatic search and manual search have limita-
tions [128]: The former depends on the selection of databases,
on database interfaces and their limitations, on the construction
of search strings, and on the identification of synonyms. The
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Fig. 1: Relations among MBE, MDE, MDD and MDS.
latter depends on the selection of research outlets, e.g. journals
or conferences, and cannot be exhaustive. Therefore Wohlin
et al. [128] proposed the snowballing search strategy as a
first step to systematic literature studies. The key actions of
the snowballing search strategy are: 1) identify a starting
set of primary papers; 2) identify further primary papers
using the reference lists of each primary paper (backward
snowballing); 3) identify further primary papers that cite the
primary papers (forward snowballing); 4) repeat steps 2 and 3
until no new primary papers are found. We are convinced, that
the snowballing search strategy complements the automatic
and manual search strategies of Kitchenham [77]. In our SLR
we defined and performed a snowballing search strategy that
builds on the set of primary papers found in automatic and
manual searches. Details of our search strategy are presented
in Section III.
B. A Definition of MDS
Numerous security engineering techniques exist which sup-
port the development of secure systems. There are also many
MDE techniques for the development and maintenance of soft-
ware systems in general. Our focus, however, is only on MDE
approaches that are specifically customized for supporting the
development of secure systems. As we already mentioned,
MDS can be considered a subset of MDE. We will now
clarify the relations between MDE, Model-Based Engineering
(MBE), Model-Driven Development (MDD), security engi-
neering, and MDS, which are important for our inclusion and
exclusion criteria (Section III-C). Regarding MBE, MDE, and
MDD, we agree with the point of view presented by Brambilla
et al. [31, p. 9]. Specifically, MBE can be used for development
processes in which models may not necessarily be the central
artifacts for development. E.g., if models are only used for
documentation purposes and not in automated transformations.
MDE can be seen as a subset of MBE in which models have
to be the key artifacts throughout the development, i.e. models
“drive” the process in every step: All development, evolution,
and migration tasks have to be influenced by explicit models.
MDD can be considered a subset of MDE that only denotes
development activities with models as the primary artifact.
Normally, model-to-model transformations (MMTs) or model-
to-text transformations (MTTs) are used in MDD to obtain
other models or to generate code. Thus, MDS refers to all
research approaches that focus on a MDD process for building
secure systems. Figure 1 depicts these subset relations.
III. Our systematic review method
Our SLR method is based on the guidelines of Kitchenham
[77], and the snowballing strategy of Wohlin et al. [128].
We presented the motivation for our review in Section I and
state our research questions in the next section. Based on
these research questions, we developed a review protocol,
which was evaluated before conducting the review. Figure
2 shows an overview of our SLR process. We combined an
automated database search (Section III-B2), a manual search in
relevant journals and conference proceedings (Section III-B3),
and a snowballing strategy (Section III-B4) to identify as
many primary MDS papers as possible. For our predefined
protocol we clarify the selection criteria (Section III-C) to
reduce a possible bias in the selection process (Section III-D).
The quality assessment, data extraction and synthesis of the
primary MDS studies are based on a fixed set of evaluation
criteria (Section IV). The results obtained from classifying,
synthesising, analysing, and comparing the data extracted from
the primary MDS studies are presented in Section V.
A. Research Questions
This SLR aims to answer the following research questions:
RQ1: How do existing MDS approaches support the
development of secure systems?
This question is further divided into the following subques-
tions:
RQ1.1: What kinds of security concerns are addressed and
what security mechanisms are used by these MDS approaches?
RQ1.2 : How do the MDS approaches specify or model
security requirements together with functional requirements?
Is there any tool that supports the modelling process?
RQ1.3 : How are model-to-model transformations (MMTs)
used and which MMT engines are used? Is there any tool
support for the transformation process?
RQ1.4 : How are model-to-text transformations (MTTs) used
to generate code, including security infrastructure and config-
uration? Which tools are used for the generation process?
RQ1.5 : Which methods were used to evaluate the approaches?
What results have been obtained?
RQ1.6 : Which application domains are addressed by the MDS
approaches?
RQ2 : What are current limitations of existing MDS
research?
RQ3 : What are open issues to be further investigated?
B. Search Strategy
We developed a hybrid strategy to exhaustively search for
MDS papers. The goal was not to miss any relevant MDS
paper and therefore to find as many primary MDS papers as
possible. Our hybrid strategy consists of three parts: automatic
search (Section III-B2), manual search (Section III-B3), and
snowballing (Section III-B4). In each step, we applied inclu-
sion and exclusion criteria (Section III-C) to select primary
MDS studies.
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Fig. 2: An overview of our SLR process.
1) Identification of a Search String : Based on the research
questions (Sect. III-A), we created search terms to form
search strings, e.g. model-driven, model-based, security. We
divided our search terms into three categories: MDE (model-
driven, model-based, model*, MDA, UML), modeling (spec-
ify*, design*), transformations (transform*, code generation)
and security.
To form the search string, we used a conjunction that
combines disjunctions of the keywords of each term group.
We had to refine our search string several times to make sure
that as many potential relevant papers as possible are reached
and had to adapt it according to the required format of the
search engines.
2) Step 1: Automatic Search in Databases for Scientific
Literature: Using the search string described earlier, we
performed automatic search within five electronic databases
for publications between 2000 and 2014: IEEE Xplore1, ACM
Digital Library1, Web of Knowledge (ISI)1, ScienceDirect
(Elsevier)2, and SpringerLink (MetaPress)2.
3) Step 2: Manual Search in Conferences Proceedings
and Journals: To ensure the correctness and completeness
of our review, we also conducted two manual searches: a
manual search in potentially relevant peer-reviewed journals,
and another one in potentially related conference proceedings.
We selected journals and conferences that are highly ranked
either in the domain of software engineering (SE) or security
and privacy (S&P). We manually searched for all published
1ieeexplore.ieee.org, dl.acm.org, apps.webofknowledge.com
2sciencedirect.com, link.springer.com
(1)	  A	  set	  of	  80	  
MDS	  papers	  
from	  
Automa5c	  
Search	  results	  
(2)	  A	  set	  of	  29	  
MDS	  papers	  
from	  Manual	  
Search	  results	  
A	  set	  of	  95	  
MDS	  papers	  
a=er	  merging	  
(1)	  and	  (2)	  
SNOWBALLING	  
The	  Final	  Set	  of	  	  
Primary	  MDS	  publica5ons	  
Fig. 3: Snowballing after Automatic Search & Manual Search.
papers from 2001 to 2014 in 10 journals and 10 conference
proceedings as shown in Table I and II.
The 10 journals are chosen based on the relevance, the
high impact index (Journal Citation Reports 2011), and the
field ranking in the last 10 years according to the Microsoft
Research website. 6 journals from SE and 4 journals from
S & P were selected. We added the Empirical Software
Engineering journal in order to find empirical validations of
MDS approaches. The 10 conferences are also chosen on the
relevance, and the conferences field ranking in the last 10 years
according to the Microsoft Research website.
4) Step 3: Snowballing for a complete set of primary MDS
papers: The automatic search and manual search processes
yielded a set 95 primary MDS papers. To make sure that
our final set of MDS papers is complete we adopted the
snowballing strategy presented by Wohlin et al. [128]. We use
the big set of primary MDS papers provided by automatic
and manual searches as input for our snowballing strategy as
follows.
Figure 3 shows how we formed the input set of MDS
papers for snowballing. After conducting the automated search
and applying the primary study selection procedures, we
obtained a first set of 80 MDS papers (Step 1). Similarly,
after conducting the manual search and applying the primary
study selection procedures, we obtained a second set of 29
MDS papers (Step 2). We merged these two sets in order to
form a set of selected MDS papers that was used for partially
conducting our snowballing strategy. Jalali et al. [61] provided
a comparison between the SLR method and the snowballing
method. They state that the snowballing method can be used
to complement the automated search and manual search in
terms of closing the final set of primary MDS papers. Because
we already performed the automatic and manual searches for
obtaining a set of 95 primary MDS papers, we only adopted
the following 3 out of 5 steps of the snowballing strategy:
1) Backward snowballing: identify further potential pri-
mary MDS papers in the reference lists of the current
primary MDS papers. Initially this is the set of papers
found by the automated search and manual search.
2) Forward snowballing: identify further potential primary
MDS papers by searching for papers that cite a current
primary MDS papers. We used Google Scholaras recom-
mended [128], because it captures more than individual
databases.
3) If no new papers are found by repeating steps 1 & 2,
then identify further primary MDS papers by searching
publications lists on personal homepages or author pages
of database and institutions for the primary authors of
the identified primary MDS approaches. This step was
performed to ensure that the most recent publications
on the same or similar topics are included. If additional
papers are identified then go back to Step 1.
Once no additional papers were found in step 3, we closed
the cycle of identified primary MDS papers for data extraction,
synthesis, and evaluation.
C. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
We already discuss our definition of MDS to give a better
idea how we consider a paper as an MDS paper in Section II.
Here, we show in detail the inclusion and exclusion criteria
that have been used in our primary MDS studies selection
process.
MDS approaches for developing secure system vary a great
deal as different security concerns can be addressed and
different model-driven techniques can be used. Therefore, it
was absolutely necessary to define thorough inclusion and
exclusion criteria to select the primary studies for answering
our research questions:
1. Papers not written in English were excluded and already
filtered out in our search process.
2. Papers with less than 5 pages in IEEE double-column
format or less than 7 pages in LNCS single-column format
were excluded.
3. Papers not concerned with MDE were excluded. For exam-
ple, papers addressing security problems without using MDE
techniques were excluded.
4. Papers proposing model-driven approaches without a focus
on security concerns were excluded. E.g., model-driven ap-
proaches for performance analysis were excluded.
5. When a single approach is presented in more than one
paper describing different parts of the approach, we included
all these papers, but still considerd them as a single approach.
6. When more than one paper described the same or similar
approaches, we only included the one with the most complete
description of the approach. E.g., an extended paper [103]
published in a journal will be selected instead of its shorter
version [102] published in a conference proceeding.
7. Papers with insufficient technical information regarding
their approaches were excluded. E.g., papers that neither
provide a detailed description of secure models, nor a precise
security notion, nor transformation techniques, were consid-
ered incomplete and were excluded.
8. Only papers with a MDD perspectiove, i.e. MDE papers in
TABLE I: Journals used in our manual search.
Acronym Full Name Field Rating
TSE IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering SE 56
JSS Journal of Systems and Software SE 34
IEEE S&P IEEE Security & Privacy S&P 31
TISSEC ACM Transactions on Information and System Security S&P 29
TDSC IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing S&P 28
COMPSEC Computers & Security S&P 27
INFSOF Information & Software Technology SE 27
SOSYM Software and System Modeling SE 27
TOSEM ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology SE 25
ESE Empirical Software Engineering SE 20
TABLE II: Conference proceedings used in our manual search.
Acronym Full Name Field Rating
ICSE International Conference on Software Engineering SE 60
CCS ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security S&P 54
S&P IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy S&P 49
USENIX USENIX Security Symposium S&P 39
AOSD Modularity/Aspect-Oriented Software Development SE 37
NDSS Network and Distributed System Security Symposium S&P 35
ACSAC Annual Computer Security Applications Conference S&P 29
SACMAT Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies S&P 28
ESORICS European Symposium on Research in Computer Security S&P 24
MODELS Model Driven Engineering Languages and Systems SE 21
TABLE III: Summary of the selection process based on
Automatic Search
Source IEEE ACM ISI SD SL Total
Search results 2997 1506 3299 828 2003 10633
After reviewing titles/keywords 109 90 91 24 81 395
After reading abstracts 78 44 35 19 61 237
After skimming/scanning 31 21 17 15 20 104
After final discussion 93
Finally selected 80
which models are central artifacts throughout the development
phase, were selected. Papers using model-based techniques
only for verifying or analyzing security mechanisms without a
link to the implementation code were excluded.
9. Papers with less than 2 citations per year minus 2 as
reported by Google Scholar were excluded.
With these 9 clearly defined inclusion and exclusion criteria,
we were able to perform the selection process in a more
transparent and less biased way.
D. Primary Studies Selection and Its Results
Here we present the selection process conducted while per-
forming each search step in the three-pronged search process
and its results. Figure 4 shows details of our whole selection
process with all the numbers of MDS papers selected in each
step.
1) Selection Process in the Automatic Search Step: Table
III shows the results of our automatic search that is explained
as follows. The papers found from the repositories described
in Section III-B2 were divided among reviewers. For each
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Fig. 4: The Selection Process with all the steps
paper, we first read the paper’s title, keywords, and the venue
where the paper was published to see whether it is relevant to
our research topic. If the title and keywords of a paper were
insufficient for deciding whether to include or exclude it, we
further checked the paper’s abstract. If the abstract of the paper
were insufficient for deciding whether to include or exclude it,
we further skimmed (and scanned if necessary) the paper’s full
text. Once each reviewer had done selecting candidate papers
from his repositories, all the candidate papers from different
repositories were merged to remove duplicates. We kept track
of this merging process to see which duplicates were found.
 for each
do
primary papers
get incoming citations
and outgoing references
cited and referenced papers
 for each
do
inspect title, abstract, kewords
[matches search string and
 is no primary paper and
 cited   twice per year - 2]
discard paper
save as new 
primary paper
skim and scan content
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cross-check
(other reviewers) [confirmed]
Fig. 5: Our selection process while snowballing
Duplicated papers were directly included in the final set of
selected papers. All other candidate papers, were discussed by
at least two reviewers. Some border-line papers were checked
by all reviewers. We maintained a list of rejected candidate
papers, with reasons for the rejection, after discussion among
reviewers. In the end, 80 MDS papers were selected.
2) Selection Process in the Manual Search Step: 29 candi-
date MDS papers were found in the manual search step. By
merging with the set of 80 papers above, we obtained in total
95 MDS papers.
3) Selection Process in the Snowballing Step: After the
first two steps, we conducted the snowballing as described
in Section III-B4. However, once obtaining all the numbers of
citations of every paper in the set of 95 MDS papers above, we
found out that some papers are much less cited than others,
or even having no citation at all. We argue that the papers
without a minimum number of citations after getting published
for a specific period could be considered as not significant
in terms of research impact and continuation. On the other
hand, we also were not too strict on this aspect. Specifically,
we decided that papers with the number of Google Scholar
citations3 less than 2 citations per year minus 2 are excluded.
Thus, the selection criterion 9 about number of Google Scholar
3The citations of these 95 MDS papers were dated on May 19, 2014
citations was added. This means we leave out the papers that
are not active, and do not have a minimum impact after being
published for more than 2 years. Of course, this also means
the recent MDS papers published in 2013 and 2014 are not
excluded by this citation criterion.
In 95 MDS papers, 31 papers were removed according
to this citation criterion. Consequently, we used 64 primary
MDS papers as the input for our snowballing process. In
the snowballing step, we also apply the citation criterion4
together with other criteria to select primary MDS papers.
Details of our selection process while snowballing are shown
in Figure 5. It is also important to note that every MDS
candidate paper is cross-checked by three reviewers before
any inclusion or exclusion decision. After all three steps, we
have ended up with 93 primary MDS papers. However, we
realised that some MDS papers, which were removed because
of the citation criterion, should be put back in the final set as
“sidekick” MDS papers. The main reason is that those MDS
papers contain extra details of the approaches presented in
the selected primary MDS papers. A “sidekick” MDS paper
is a true MDS paper that was only excluded because of
the citation criterion. Every “sidekick” MDS paper is part
of a primary MDS approach. If they were removed, some
important properties of the relevant primary MDS approaches
could be missing in the data analysis. E.g., a paper presents
an empirical study of a primary MDS approach. We would
miss that empirical study of the primary MDS approach if the
“sidekick” paper was removed because of the citation criterion.
Thus, 15 “sidekick” MDS papers were put back in the final
set. In the end, the final set of 108 MDS papers is used for
data extraction and evaluation.
IV. Evaluation criteria & Data extraction strategy
Classifications and taxonomies are important in any research
domain, e.g. [39], [81]. In this section, we describe a set
of key artefacts of MDS that forms a so-called evaluation
taxonomy of MDS. We derived our evaluation taxonomy from
our research questions. Moreover, our evaluation taxonomy are
also based on the synthesis of evaluation criteria described in
[73] and [71]. Having an evaluation taxonomy makes it more
systematic to assess key artefacts of MDS as well as classify
and compare different MDS approaches.
Our taxonomy of MDS classifies different dimensions that
one has to take into account while leveraging MDE techniques
for developing secure systems. The elements of our taxonomy
are described as follows. For each element, the data extraction
strategy is described to show how we extracted data from the
primary studies to answer our research questions.
Security concerns: In this dimension, we classify primary
studies according to the security concerns/mechanisms that
the MDS approaches are dealing with. The range of security
concerns is broad, e.g. authorisation, authenticity, availability,
confidentiality, integrity, etc. We will count the number of
papers addressing each security concern. Thus, security topic
4The citations of MDS papers found in snowballing were dated on-the-fly.
areas that addressed by the MDS approaches are measured
quantitatively.
Modelling approaches: Security concerns can be modelled
separately or not from the business logic, and by using dif-
ferent modelling techniques/languages. Primary studies can be
classified by the paradigms of modelling, i.e. Aspect-Oriented
Modelling (AOM) or non-AOM. In AOM approaches, se-
curity concerns are modelled in separate aspect models to
be eventually woven (integrated) into the primary model(s).
Using AOM, security concerns can be modelled separately,
modularly in design units (aspects) [113]. Vice versa, in
non-AOM approaches, security concerns are not modelled as
AOM aspects. That means security concerns can be modelled
together with business logic in every place where they are
needed. But, we also classify as non-AOM approaches where
security concerns modelled separately (separation of concerns)
from the business logic that can be integrated later into the
system. E.g., a non-AOM approach could (separately) specify
an access control policy using a Domain-Specific Language
(DSL)5, and then transform and generate XACML6 standard
file for enforcing the access control policy. In other words, we
would like to know the percentage of non-AOM approaches
compared to the percentage of “full” AOM/Aspect-Oriented
Software Development (AOSD) approaches. Separation of
concerns can be considered as a key principle to cope with
modern complex systems. Furthermore, approaches are also
classified by the modelling languages, e.g. UML diagrams,
UML profiles, or some kinds of DSLs, used to model se-
curity concerns and business logic. The outcome models are
classified as of type standard or non-standard, and structural,
behavioural, functional or other types. The granularity levels
of outcome models are also reviewed.
Model-to-model transformations (MMTs) & tools:
MMTs can take part in the key steps of the development
process, e.g. for composing security models into business
models or transforming platform-independent models (PIMs)
to platform-specific models (PSMs). We extract data related
to MMTs for answering the following questions: How well-
defined are the MMTs rules? How MMTs are implemented?
Using which MMT engines (e.g. ATL7, QVT8, Kermeta9,
Graph-based MMTs, etc.)? Is there any tool support for
the transformation process? What is the automation level
of MMTs: automatic (if entire process of creating the tar-
get model can be done automatically), semi-automatic, and
manual. Some information about the classification of MMTs
should also be extracted to see if it supports well for the
security mechanisms? E.g., endogenous MMTs or exogenous
MMTs used?
Model-to-text transformations (MTTs, code and security
infrastructure generation) & tools: MDE also supports the
5http://martinfowler.com/books/dsl.html
6extensible Access Control Markup Language, a XML-based declarative
access control policy language
7http://www.eclipse.org/atl/
8http://projects.eclipse.org/projects/modeling.mmt
9www.kermeta.org
development of secure systems by automatically generating
code, including (partial) complete, configured security infras-
tructures. Data should be extracted to see the main purposes
of using code generation techniques. Is the whole system
including security infrastructure generated? Or just the security
infrastructure (configuration) is generated? Can fully code
and security infrastructure be generated? Or just the (code)
skeleton of the system is generated? Which tools are used for
the code generation process?
Application domains: MDS approaches are also classified
on the target application domains of the secure systems. Some
MDS approaches might target only a specific application
domain. Some might explicitly be applicable to different
application domains in general. Others might implicitly be
applicable to different application domains. Some examples
of application domains are information systems, web ap-
plications, databases, secure smart-card systems, embedded
systems, distributed systems, etc. The application domains
might be overlapping but could show relatively the intended
application domain(s) of a specific MDS approach.
Evaluation methods: To point out the limitations of each
approach, we check again how the approach has been eval-
uated. How many case studies have been performed? What
results have been obtained? What other evaluation methods
(other than case studies) have been applied to evaluate these
approaches? This can be answered by extracting data from the
validation section of each paper.
To make the data extraction consistent among the reviewers,
we all tried to extract the relevant data from a small set of
prospective primary papers. We then discussed to ensure a
common understanding of all the extracted data items and
refined the data extraction procedure. Excel files were used
for storing the extracted data while a tool called Mendeley10
was used in reviewing and controlling the selected papers.
The final set of primary studies (selected papers) was divided
among reviewers. Each reviewer examined again the allocated
papers and enriched the Excel files to ensure detailed data ac-
cording to the taxonomy has been extracted from the selected
papers. The data extraction forms of each reviewer were read
and discussed by two other reviewers. All ambiguities were
clarified by discussion among the reviewers.
To answer the last two research questions, we reviewed the
range of security topics, the scope of MDS research work and
the quality of MDS research results to determine whether there
are any observable limitations and open issues.
V. Results
First, in Section V-A we report on some statistic results
according to the evaluation criteria. Then, the principal MDS
approaches and other emerging/less common MDS approaches
are revealed and described in Sections V-B, V-C respectively.
Finally, Section V-D analyses the trends of some key factors
in MDS.
10http://www.mendeley.com/
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Fig. 7: Statistics of some key MDS artefacts
A. Results per Evaluation Criterion
An overview of the results can be seen in Figures 6, 7 and
Table IV. Fig. 6 shows the statistics about how each security
concern has been addressed by the primary MDS approaches.
Fig. 7 visualises other key results for a representative set of
evaluation criteria. Table IV summarises all the values for all
evaluation criteria. We present the results for each evaluation
criterion as follows.
Security concerns/mechanisms: Fig. 6 shows the statistic
of security concerns tackled by the reviewed MDS approaches.
We can see that authorisation is addressed the most, by 75%
of the examined MDS papers. Moreover, more than half of
the MDS papers (53%) deal with authorisation only (Fig.
6a,b). The second security concern in terms of receiving
attention is confidentiality addressed by 42% of the exam-
ined MDS papers. 11% of the examined MDS papers tackle
confidentiality solely (Fig. 6a,b). Other security concerns, like
integrity, authentication, and availability are, however, less
tackled with 27%, 24%, and 16% correspondingly. These
results suggest that more MDS research work should focus
on particular security concerns like integrity, availability, and
authentication.
We also would like to know how much multiple security
concerns are tackled at the same time by the MDS approaches.
Fig. 6b displays the statistic about how much three key security
concerns (Authentication, Authorisation, and Confidentiality)
are tackled solely and simultaneously. Only 13% of the
examined MDS papers propose methodologies to tackle all
three together. About 15% of the examined MDS papers
deal with two concerns simultaneously: Authentication and
Authorisation (3%), Authentication and Confidentiality (6%),
Confidentiality and Authorisation (6%). Not only multiple
security concerns are less tackled, but also rarely the inter-
relations among multiple security concerns are formally taken
into account in the reviewed MDS approaches. Future MDS
approaches should address multiple security concerns simul-
taneously, systematically by formally specifying inter-security
concern relations. The inter-relation among security concerns
have to be taken into account while developing DSLs for
specifying security requirements.
These first results are very interesting. Indeed, an open
question is “why in MDS authorisation and confidentiality got
more attention?”. A possible answer could be that MDS is a
relatively young research area with more “model-driven” than
“security”. MDS is the common name of the MDE approaches
specifically focusing on secure systems development. Thus,
among the authors of the published MDS papers, there are
significantly more researchers with MDE background than se-
curity engineering background. Researchers that mainly work
with MDE techniques may first address authorisation (e.g.
AC) because it is closer to application logic and functional re-
quirements than other security concerns. This could be linked
to the nature of security concerns. Some security concerns (e.g.
authorisation) are closer to the application level than others.
MDE researcher might not be familiar with security concerns
to be addressed at the network layer. Given the background
of the authors of the most renowned MDS approaches, it
might be that we need more interest in MDE from the
security engineering community to see more MDS approaches
dealing with security concerns like integrity, availability, and
authentication. Therefore, we suggest that more effort should
be put into communicating MDE techniques as well as MDS
approaches to the security engineering community.
Modeling approaches: Fig. 7a shows that 87% of the exam-
ined papers used standard UML models and defined DSLs for
security concerns using the profile and stereotype mechanisms
of the UML. 13% used other DSLs (e.g. [92], [83], or [93]).
Thus, we understand that standardised, common UML models
are broadly used by MDS approaches. On the other hand,
defining DSLs (either UML profiles or other DSLs) is also
very popular to leverage MDE techniques for secure systems
development. UML profiles and other kinds of DSLs have
been developed to better capture the specific semantics of
security concerns. In other words, defining DSLs plays a key
role in MDS because that way allows expressing security
concepts/elements more easily. However, using UML profiles
is not the only way for developing DSLs in MDS approaches.
DSLs which are not UML profiles are also recommended,
especially DSLs that can deal with multiple security concerns
in the same system.
15% of the papers discuss approaches that are based on
AOM (Fig. 7b) where security concerns are specified as as-
pects and eventually woven into primary models. Even though
the remaining 85% are not really aspect-oriented, most of them
still follow the separation of concerns principle and really
separate security concerns from the main business logic 11. In
most of the cases, security concerns were specified separately
from the business logic in PIMs and transformed into PSMs
that can be refined into security infrastructures (e.g. XACML)
integrated with the systems.
Security concerns are often modelled and analysed with a
DSL that is concern-specific. But, few MDS papers have well-
defined semantics for their languages so that these languages
can be used for formal analysis. Only some papers related
to the UMLsec, SecureUML approaches (see Section V-B)
provide some formal basis for security analyses. This shows
that further efforts are required to mature security-specific
modelling languages to foster analyses. Most (89%) of the
MDS papers use structural models. Behavioural models are
used in 31% of the reviewed MDS papers. Other types of
models like domain specific models accounted for 13%. Using
solely one type of models could not be enough to be able to
express multiple security concerns. Thus, very few modelling
approaches propose to deal with multiple security concerns
together like [50, 108]. Most of them are specific to address
only one security concern solely.
Model-to-model transformations (MMTs) & tools: Table
IV shows that 74% of the papers clearly mentioned MMTs
11Note that in this paper we only classified a modelling approach as AOM
if a concern is modelled as an aspect model that can be woven into a primary
model. We explained this point in Section IV.
while 26% did not use or mentioned transformations, e.g.,
because of a manual integration of security. More specifically,
57% of the examined papers use exogenous transformations.
Most of these were used to transform PIMs to PSMs (Fig. 7d).
Security concerns were modelled using DSLs for each concern
to obtain PIMs that were transformed into PSMs, which can be
refined into code. 19% define endogenous MMTs that are used
to weave/compose security models into base models defined
using the same DSLs.
34% of the examined MDS papers implement automatic
MMTs, 6% describe semi-automatic (interactive) MMTs, and
only 4% are manual (Fig. 7e). But 56% do not specifically pro-
vide any implementation information about MMTs, e.g. some
simply provide mapping rules for transforming models. Hav-
ing automated MMTs is one of the key success factors of MDE
[60] and MMTs play a crucial role in MDS as well. Especially
some important semantics of security mechanisms might be
embedded in the MMTs. Providing MMTs implementation
details in MDS is important to evaluate the efficiency of
each approach. It can be also helpful for other researchers
to learn from previous experiences in choosing or developing
a suitable transformation engine for their work. 19% of the
selected MDS papers describe their MMTs implementation
using standard transformation languages like ATL and QVT.
81% of the papers only describe the transformation rules
without implementation details, or use other transformation
languages like graph-based transformations, or specific (Java-
based) compilers/tools.
Model-to-text transformations (MTTs) & tools: Table IV
shows that 64% of the papers describe MTTs or the generation
of code or security infrastructures. 36% of the papers do not
describe MTTs in details. Some mainly used models for veri-
fying or analyzing implemented secure systems, e.g. UMLsec
where code/security infrastructure generation is mainly men-
tioned in future work. Comparing the purposes of MTTs,
we can see in Fig. 7c that there are nearly as many MDS
papers (34%) that only generate security infrastructure, such
as XACML or security aspects code, as the MDS papers that
describe generation of both code and security infrastructure
(29%).
The tools used for code generation are not shown in Table
IV because there are too many different tools. Besides Eclipse-
based MTT engines like Xpand12, there are many cases where
ad-hoc self-developed engines (e.g. Java-based tools, parsers,
etc.) are used. A reason for that could be that many “ad-
hoc” tools are preferred because of their specific support
for a specific security domain. Ark [127]13, for example,
transforms an input UML model designed with the proposed
UML profile into a skeleton of application code (program code
and deployment descriptor). More ad-hoc Java-based tools like
the one in [32] generates code (XACML policy files) from the
constraints specified in SECTET-PL The tool uses Antlr [104],
a compiler program for the syntax analysis of the constraints.
12https://www.eclipse.org/modeling/m2t/?project=xpand
13extends the code generation engine of the openArchitectureWare frame-
work that was already migrated into Eclipse as Xpand
TABLE IV: Results classified by the evaluation criteria
Evaluation criteria # papers %
Security concerns
(overlapping)
Confidentiality 45 42
Integrity 29 27
Availability 17 16
Authenticity 26 24
Authorisation 81 75
Aspect-Oriented
Modeling/AOSD
Yes 16 15
No 92 85
Standard models Yes(UML/UML profiles) 94 87Other DSLs 14 13
Type of models
(overlapping)
Structural 96 89
Behavioural 33 31
Others 14 13
Transformations used Yes 80 74No/Unknown 28 26
Transformations level
Endogenous 20 19
Exogenous 62 57
Not Provided 26 24
Transformations
automation
Automatic 37 34
Semi-automatic 6 6
Manual 4 4
Not Provided 61 56
Standard
Transformations
ATL/QVT 20 19
Others/not mentioned 88 81
Code generation
mentioned
Yes 69 64
No 39 36
Code + Security
Infrastructures generated
Yes 31 29
Only Security Infrastructure 37 34
Not Provided 40 37
Application
Domains
IS/e-commerce 19 18
Data warehouses 20 19
Smart cards/ embedded systems 7 6
Distributed Systems/SOA 34 31
Others 28 26
Type of validation Controlled experiment 2 2Industry case studies 5 5
Academic case studies 72 67
Example only 23 21
Not Provided 6 5
In general, MMTs and MTTs are widely used in MDS to
improve the productivity of the development process. Most of
the primary MDS approaches do mention to leverage MMTs or
MTTs by describing transformation rules/intentions. However,
more than half of the primary MDS approaches did not provide
implementation details of MMTs or MTTs. Not many primary
MDS approaches use standard transformation languages/tools
like ATL or QVT but rather ad-hoc tools like Java-based
compiler/tools for engineering security into the system. With
the progress in the maturity of standard MMT and MTT tools,
they should be leveraged more in the future MDS approaches.
Most of the MMTs in the selected studies are exogenous
used for transforming PIMs to PSMs. The main reason is that
there are many approaches (e.g. dealing with access control)
generating only security infrastructure. Access control models
(PIMs) often used to generate XACML configuration files
(PSMs) for enforcing security policy. Another reason could be
the lack of all-round approaches for the whole development
cycle of secure systems which in the end lead to automatic
generation of both code and security infrastructure. An all-
round approach could follow AOM paradigm to fully leverage
the automation of MMTs and MTTs for composing, trans-
forming and generating both code and security infrastructure.
Developing tool chains (based on MMTs and MTTs) to derive
from models to implementation code is also an important piece
of future work. Few complete tool chains to automate (most
of) the MDS development process have emerged, but are still
rare.
Application domains: Fig. 7f shows the main application
domains that have been secured by MDS approaches. In gen-
eral, these are distributed systems or SOA (31%), information
systems or e-commerce (18%), data warehouses (19%), and
smart cards/embedded systems (6%). The remaining MDS
papers do not clearly state a domain, or could be generically
applicable for different application domains, such as [59, 74,
95, 108].
Evaluation methods: Most of the papers (67%) describe
academic case studies used to evaluate their approaches. There
are still quite many MDS papers (21%) which only provide
“running examples” to illustrate their approaches. Few MDS
papers show controlled experiments (2%) and industry case
studies (5%) in the evaluation of their approaches. There are
very few papers that provide an in-depth evaluation like [38],
[118], and [21]. Therefore, we suggest that more effort should
be put in evaluating MDS approaches, e.g., with empirical
studies or benchmarks.
B. Principal MDS Approaches
Altogether, the synthesised data show that there are cur-
rently several MDS approaches that have been proposed, used,
and discussed in multiple publications. We would like to
identify the most influential MDS approaches in terms of
numbers of publications and citations. In total, five primary
MDS approaches, which are called principal MDS approaches,
have been identified. They are summarised in Table V. Each
has at least 7 primary MDS papers in our final set. The details
of each approach, except Secure data warehouses, can be
found in [79]. Here we briefly present each approach, and
then compare some key points among them.
SECTET firstly aimed at securing web services by lever-
aging the Object Constraint Language (OCL) for specifying
RBAC [5]. Based on that, a complete configured security
infrastructure (XACML policy files) is generated. Later on, the
authors proposed a specification language namely SECTET-
PL (OCL-based) which is part of the SECTET framework for
model-driven security for B2B workflows. In this framework,
Constraint based RBAC (CRBAC) can be specified and then
transformed into low-level web services standard artefacts
[7]. SECTET-PL is also used for modeling restricted (RBAC-
based) delegation in Service Oriented Architecture [8]. Their
modeling approach is extended in [53, 54]. MMT and MTT
are both carried out in a complete model-driven framework
[32, 34, 56]. SECTET mainly addresses RBAC as its security
concern and focuses on generating security infrastructure
(XACML), not all the source code. Recently, Memon et al.
[80] and also Katt et al. [72] propose two pattern refinement
approaches based on SECTET framework that allows flexible
configurations of SOA security.
Secure data warehouses (DWs) are the motivation for the
work of developing MDS techniques for secure database de-
velopment. This MDS approach is very specific for developing
secure DWs. Ferna´ndez-Medina et al. [43, 44] extend OCL and
UML for secure database development [45]. Their approach
also uses UML profiles for modelling security enriched PIMs
as inputs for a model-driven framework to create secure DW
solutions [46, 115]. Secure PIMs can be transformed to secure
PSMs by a set of formally defined QVT rules [116, 117, 118].
These PSMs can then be used for generating code with security
properties. A similar MDS approach for developing secure
XML data warehouses is presented in [122, 123, 124, 125]
More recently, the above mentioned techniques for secure DW
development are also leveraged in a reverse engineering style
to modernise legacy DWs [27].
SecureMDD is proposed for facilitating the development
of smart card applications based on UML models. In Se-
cureMDD, UML class diagrams are used for modelling
static aspects while UML sequence and activity diagrams are
used for modelling dynamic aspects of a system [90]. From
platform-independent UML models (PIMs) of a system, its
formal abstract state machine (ASM) specification and Java
Card code are generated. The generated abstract state machine
specification is used for formally proving the correctness of the
generated code regarding the security properties of the system.
Thus, their MDS approach integrates MDE techniques with
semi-formal and formal methods for verification as well as
the implementation of security-critical applications [85, 86,
88]. The authors illustrated that SecureMDD is applicable
for the development of large and complex secure Smart Card
applications as well [87]. The main limitations of SecureMDD
are its specific application domain and the lack of analysis for
consistency between the UML models and the ASM model.
SecureUML is the approach which aims at bridging the
gap between security modeling languages and design modeling
languages. First, UML and UML profile are used for modeling
application with role-based access control that can lead to
generated complete access control infrastructures [78]. Then,
Basin et al. [18] propose a UML-based language (UML pro-
files) with different dialects, which forms modeling languages
(such as SecureUML + ComponentUML) for designing secure
systems. Access control infrastructures for server-based appli-
cations can be generated automatically from models. Their
work mainly focuses on access control constraints based on
RBAC in design models. Semantics of SecureUML (and
ComponentUML) are provided by Brucker et al. [35] and
Basin et al. [14, 16] which enable formal analysis of security-
design models. Based on this work, Clavel et al. show and
discuss their practical experience of applying SecureUML in
industrial settings [38]. Recently, the work on SecureUML has
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been continued by combining SecureUML + ComponentUML
with a language for graphical user interfaces (GUI), namely
ActionGUI [15, 19]. These modeling languages with MMT
enable the full generation of security-aware GUIs from models
for data-centric applications with access control policies. An-
other recent work by Dios et al. [40] makes use of ActionGUI
for model driven development of a secure eHealth application.
The main limitation of SecureUML is its sole focus on access
control.
UMLsec is one of the most well-known UML-based ap-
proaches in MDS proposed early by Ju¨rjens [65, 66]. Secu-
rity requirements, threat scenarios, security concepts, security
mechanisms, security primitives can be modeled by using
security-related stereotypes (UML profiles), tags, goal trees.
and security constraints. Thus, it is possible to formally
analyze UMLsec diagrams against security requirements re-
garding their dynamic behaviors. Not like SecureUML only
focusing on authorisation (e.g. access control), UMLsec ad-
dresses multiple security concerns such as confidentiality,
integrity [64]. Not to a great extent but AOM is also used
in the UMLsec approach [67]. Later on, UMLsec is deployed
by Best et al. [21] in an industrial context for designing and
analyzing designs of distributed information systems. On the
other hand, relevant tools support for UMLsec are presented
in [68]. To tackle also social challenges in security, UMLsec
was combined with Secure Tropos [96] to take on security
from requirement engineering phase [98]. This work is then
extended and applied to two different industrial case studies
[97]. A more recent work related to UMLsec is by Ju¨rjens et al.
[69] for incremental security verification for evolving UMLsec
models. However, UMLsec lacks support for improving pro-
ductivity of the development process in terms of automated
model transformations. Even having a view from models to
code but the lack of automated transformation(s) from models
to implementation code is a miss in UMLsec. Other than
that, UMLsec could be considered as the most complete
and mature MDS approach that deals with multiple security
concerns, from very early at the requirement engineering level,
with transformations, formal analysis possibility, tools support,
industrial case studies.
In general, the most common point among the principal
MDS approaches is that they all propose to use UML profiles
in their modeling phase. Even though not following truly
AOM, defining UML profiles as DSLs for modeling secu-
rity concerns still allows these principal MDS approaches to
have separation of concerns. Except SecureUML which only
addresses access control, other approaches are able to touch
multiple security concerns. Structural models are mainly used
in all five approaches. SecureMDD and UMLsec have also
used behavioral models. Exogenous MMTs are defined in
SECTET and SecureDWs to transform PIMs (UML models)
to PSMs. SecureUML and UMLsec integrate security into
systems specified in UML using endogenous MMTs. Se-
cureMDD combine both kinds of MMTs in their development
process. Some standard transformation tools are used (e.g.
QVT and XPAND) among other self-developed tools (java-
based compilers). With their formal background, SecureMDD,
SecureUML and UMLsec provide some tools for formal
verification of security properties. These three also have in-
dustrial case studies while SECTET and SecureDWs have
not. Generally, each approach is quite specific to a application
domain, e.g. SecureDWs for secure database development, or
SecureMDD for secure smart card development.
C. Less common/emerging MDS Approaches
It would not be fair to only discuss about the above-
mentioned principal MDS approaches. There are other less
common or emerging MDS approaches that are also worth to
get noticed and analysed. We discuss some representative ones
here. For the full list, readers are referred to Tables VI and
VII. The less common or emerging MDS approaches here are
simply classified into several groups as follows.
Pattern-based MDS: Based on domain-independent, time-
proven security knowledge and expertise, security patterns
can guide security at each stage of the development pro-
cess. Some MDS approaches that leverage security patterns
are remarkable. Abramov et al. [1, 2, 3] propose an MDS
framework for integrating access control policies into database
development. At the pre-development stage, organisational
policies are specified as security patterns. Then, the specified
security patterns guide the definition and implementation of
the security requirements which are defined as part of the data
model. The database code can be generated automatically after
the correct implementation of the security patterns has been
verified at the design stage. Their approach has been evaluated
in a controlled experiment [2]. Also using security patterns but
at a different level of abstraction, Kim et al. [74, 75] develop
a pattern-based technique for systematic, model-driven devel-
opment of secure systems focusing on access control. Because
this work mainly focuses on the design stage, access control
is specified as design pattern. Bouaziz et al. [29] introduce a
security pattern integration process for component-based mod-
els. With this process, security patterns can be integrated in the
whole development process, from UML component modelling
until aspect code generation. Another pattern-driven approach
is proposed by Schnjakin et al. [112] for facilitating the
configuration of security modules for service-based systems.
The proposed security advisor enables the transformation from
the general security goals, via security patterns at different
abstraction level, to concrete security configurations. Menzel
[82] uses the security configuration patterns to operate the
transformation of architecture models annotated with security
intentions to security policies. The patterns that provide expert
knowledge on Web Service security can be specified using a
DSL. As using cloud services provided by cloud providers
is getting more popular, Moral-Garcia et al. [91] recently
propose an enterprise security pattern for securing Software as
a Service. The security solution provided by the pattern can
be driven by making design decisions whilst performing the
transformation between the solution models. Specifically, from
a Computation Independent Model (cim), different PIMs can
be derived based on different design decisions with security
patterns. Those PIMs are transformed into PSMs which are
then transformed into Product Dependent Models (pdms).
MDS for Security@Runtime: Many modern applications
such as cloud-based software-as-a-service (SaaS) applications
require the dynamic adaptation or even evolution of both
security and service at runtime. More and more (MDS)
approaches have been being proposed in this area. Almorsy
et al. [12] introduce an approach called Model Driven Security
Engineering at Runtime (MDSE@R). MDSE@R is based on
a UML profile with tool supports for separately specifying
base system and security, and then merging those models into
a joint system-security model. Because security and system
models are separated and loosely coupled, they can evolve
more easily. Security controls are enforced dynamically into
the target system at the code level. After that, in [11] the
same authors leverage the MDSE@R approach for multi-
tenant, cloud-hosted SaaS applications. This allows dynami-
cally engineering security for multi-tenant SaaS applications
at runtime. Recently, Almorsy et al. [10] develop a new DSL
called SecDVSL for specifying visually a variety of security
concepts like objectives, threats, requirement, architecture,
and enforcement controls. SecDVSL also allows maintaining
traceability among these security concepts. Not specifically
for SaaS applications but component-based architecture, Morin
et al. [92] leverage the notion of model@run.time to enable
dynamically enforcing role-based access control policies into
component-based systems. In the follow-up work, Nguyen
et al. [103] deal with not only access control policies but
also the more complex, but essential, delegation of rights
mechanism. The propose MDS framework allows dynamically
enforcing/weaving access control policies with various delega-
tion features into security-critical systems. This is done with a
flexibly dynamic adaptation strategy. Another runtime-update
of security policy-based approach is presented by Elrakaiby
et al. [42]. The introduced DSL called Security@Runtime cov-
ers many of the security requirements of modern applications
such as authorisation, obligation, and reaction policies. Xiao
[130]’s work is on adaptive and secure multi-agent systems.
The authors adopting the adaptive agent model to put forward a
security-aware model-driven mechanism by using an extension
of RBAC model.
MDS for Secure SOA: Many MDS approaches focus on
securing service-oriented systems (SOSs). Gilmore et al. [51]
show how services, service compositions, and non-functional
properties can be modeled using their self-developed UML
profile and its extension. They address non-functional prop-
erties in general where security is considered with perfor-
mance and reliable messaging. The models are the input for
the framework VIATRA14 to derive deployment mechanisms
using MMT and MTT. Wada et al. [127] also address non-
functional aspects in SOA with a MDD framework and tool
support. Their work is empirically evaluated to show the
improvement in the reusability and maintainability of service-
oriented applications. More specifically to integrate security-
14http://www.eclipse.org/viatra/
related non-functional aspects in the development of services,
Gallino et al. [49] present their MDS solution using multiple
domain-specific models independently addressing security as-
pects. Hoisl et al. [57, 58] propose an MDS approach based
on SoaML for specification and the enforcement of secure
object flows in process-driven SOA. [83, 84] introduce a
security metamodel for SOA. This metamodel is the base
for their MDS framework that allows modelling of security
requirements in system design models. Going further than
modelling, Nakamura et al. [99] propose an MDS tooling
framework to generate Web services security configurations.
In the same line, intermediate model structure is introduced
by Satoh et al. [109, 110] to simplify the transformation
rules for transforming a security policy written in WebService-
SecurityPolicy into platform-specific configuration files.
Aspect-Oriented Modelling in MDS: AOM techniques
would be ideal for MDS with fully separation of concerns
support. With AOM, security concerns can be modelled sepa-
rately, and then automatically composed into primary models.
All of the reviewed MDS approaches in this category except
[106, 131] tackle multiple security concerns. These approaches
aim at dealing with multiple security concerns as one would
expect from any AOM approach. Georg et al. [50] propose
a methodology that allows not only security mechanisms but
also attacks to be modelled as aspect models. The attacks mod-
els can be composed with the primary model of the application
to obtain the misuse model. The authors then use the Alloy
Analyser 15 to reason about the misuse model. If the misuse
model shows that the application is compromised, some se-
curity mechanism must be incorporated into the application.
The Alloy Analyser is used again to verify that the secured
application model is now resilient to the attack. Mouheb et al.
[94] and Mouheb et al. [95] develop a UML profile that
allows specifying security mechanisms as aspect models. The
aspect models often go together with their integration speci-
fication. Their approach allows security aspects to be woven
automatically into UML design models (class diagrams, state
machine diagrams, sequence diagrams, and activity diagrams)
[95]. In [94], the authors present a full security hardening
approach, from design to implementation. Not only restricted
to security aspects, Sa´nchez et al. [108] propose a MDD ap-
proach for all early aspects, including security. The difference
with other approaches is that they focus on aspect-oriented
requirements specifications (models). These aspect-oriented
requirements models are then automatically transformed into
aspect-oriented architecture models. Not dealing with multiple
security concerns, Ray et al. [106] introduce an AOM approach
for addressing access control. Specifically, RBAC aspects can
be modeled using parameterised UML models as patterns.
This allows uniformly incorporate pervasive access control
functionality into a design. The woven model can be analysed
to check the correctness of incorporation. Zhu et al. [131]
propose a model-based aspect-oriented framework for building
intrusion-aware software systems. There, attack scenarios and
15http://alloy.mit.edu
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intrusion detection aspects are modelled using an aspect-
oriented UML profile. The intrusion detection aspect models
are used to automatically generate aspect-oriented codes. The
aspect-oriented codes are woven into the target systems us-
ing an aspect weaver to obtain the intrusion-aware software
system. Recently, Horcas et al. [59] propose a hybrid AOSD
and MDE approach for automatically weaving a customised
security model into the base application model. By using
the Common Variability Language (CVL) and atl, different
security concerns can be woven into the base application
in an aspect-oriented way, according to weaving patterns.
However, inter-security concern relations have not been taken
into account.
MDS for Access Control: Section V-A shows that access
control problem got the most attention from the MDS com-
munity. We discuss here some representative MDS approaches
that specifically address access control. Ahn et al. [4] pro-
pose a framework for representing security model, specifying
and validating security policy, and automatically generating
security enforcement codes. This framework leverages the
MDD approach together with a systematic tool to build secure
systems. Also presenting a MDD approach for access control,
Fink et al. [47] aim at developing access control policies for
distributed systems using MOF and UML profiles. However,
this approach does not work well with module-based system
like systems based on SOAP 16. Kim et al. [76] present a
feature-based approach that enables systematic configuration
of RBAC features for developing customisable access control-
based enterprise systems. Feature modelling is used for effec-
tively capturing the variabilities of the RBAC. UML models
are used for specifying the static and behavioural properties
of RBAC features. The composition method in their approach
is used for building RBAC configuration, which also serves
as a verification point for correctness of composition. Aiming
at a full design-to-testing MDD process, Mouelhi et al. [93]
introduce a generic access control metamodel. The generic
access control policy model specified by the metamodel is
automatically transformed into security policy for the XACML
platform, and integrated in the target application using aspect-
oriented programming. Model-based mutation testing makes
the access control enforcement quantitatively testable. Pavlich-
Mariscal et al. [105] propose a MD framework with a set
of composable access control features that can be tightly
integrated into the UML. At the code level, access control
is map to the policy code which realises access control
diagrams and features, and the enforcement code, to restrict
access to methods based on information of the policy code.
The degree of traceability of mappings is assessed. Recently,
Schefer-Wenzl et al. [111] propose a full MDD approach for
specifying and enforcing break-glass policies in process-aware
information systems. By tackling a complex security exception
handling mechanism like break-glass policies with MDS, this
work shows developing DSLs for specific security concerns
are a good way to capture well the semantics of these concerns.
16http://www.w3.org/TR/soap/
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Based on that, a typical MDD process can be developed for
derive security from specification to enforcement with tools
support. Bertolino et al. [20] even go further in terms of tools
support by providing a toolchain for designing, generating. and
testing access control policies. This toolchain is the result of
integrating specific tools for specific stages of the development
cycle that have been developed in a collaborative research
network. The research around UMLsec has also resulted in
various tools support but not yet systematically formed a tool
chain.
Miscellaneous: Neisse et al. [100] present one of few
MDS approaches about usage control, the next generation of
access control. Consisting of authorisations and obligations,
high-level usage control policies are specified considering an
abstract system model and automatically refined with the help
of policy refinement rules to implementation-level policies.
The work by Elrakaiby et al. [42] mentioned above can also
be categorised as usage control. In the domain of securing
embedded systems, the approach we reviewed is by Eby et al.
[41]. The authors propose a framework to incorporate security
modelling into embedded system design. Their security analy-
sis tool is capable of analysing the flow of data objects through
a system and identifying points that are vulnerable to attack.
Not restricted to a particular application domain, ModelSec by
Sa´nchez et al. [107] can deal with multiple security concerns
in an integrated fashion, including privacy, integrity, access
control, authentication, availability, non-repudiation, and au-
diting. ModelSec supports defining and managing security
requirements by building security requirements models for
an application from which operational security models can
then be generated. Recently, Busch et al. [37] present an
MDS approach specific for securing web applications, tack-
ling multiple security concerns. The graphical, UML-based
Web Engineering (UWE) language is extended for specifying
security concerns in web applications. Moreover, the approach
is mapped to an iterative development cycle from requirement
specification to testing and deployment with tools support.
D. Trend analysis of MDS approaches
In terms of publication, we can see in Fig. 8 there was a peak
time for primary MDS publications in 2009. As we mentioned,
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the primary MDS approaches were first introduced from 2002.
From 2002-2008, more primary MDS papers were published at
conferences than journals. The number of primary MDS papers
published at conferences were going up until 2007. In 2008,
the number of primary MDS papers published at conferences
decreased. One of the reasons could be primary MDS papers
were under submission to journals. In 2009, there was a peak
number of primary MDS papers published in journals. After
the peak in 2009, the trend of primary MDS publications looks
more stable for the period 2010-2014. From 2010 to 2014, less
primary MDS papers were published than the previous 5-year
period (2005-2009). However, the trend of publishing primary
MDS papers in the period 2010-2014 seems more stable.
Similarly to the trend of publications, the trend of how
security concerns have been addressed also has a peak time
in 2009. Fig. 9 shows that, nearly all the time reviewed,
authorisation is the concern that has been addressed the most.
Only in 2009, confidentiality was tackled by more primary
MDS papers than authorisation. The other concerns were
always less focused than authorisation and confidentiality all
the time reviewed. Until 2014, authorisation looks like still
being addressed the most by the MDS research community.
MDS researchers should pay more attention to the less tackled
security concerns, and should aim at a solution addressing
multiple security concerns simultaneously.
The trends of how MDE artefacts leveraged in the primary
MDS approaches look well coupled with the number of
primary MDS publications. The line of each artefact is very
close to the others (see Fig. 10). This means that most primary
MDS approaches did leverage the key artefacts of MDE in
secure systems development. It is easily understandable that as
long as we clearly define how an approach can be considered
an MDS approach, most of the key MDE artefacts have to be
leveraged in an MDS approach. This trend should hold in the
future as well.
In terms of publication venues, Information and Software
Technology (IST) journal and ACM/IEEE International Con-
ference on Model Driven Engineering Languages and Systems
(MODELS) are so far the most popular venues for publi-
cation of primary MDS papers. Fig. 11 shows that at least
10 primary MDS publications have been found in each of
these two venues. The next two attractive venues for primary
MDS papers are ARES (security conference), and SoSym
(MDE journal). Primary MDS papers were also published at
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Fig. 10: Trend of MDE artefacts leveraged by MDS studies
some other general journals (Journal of Universal Computer
Science) or domain specific conferences (IEEE International
Conference on Web Services). The proceedings of Tutorial
Lectures on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design
(FOSAD) contains some significant primary MDS approaches
as well. In general, except ARES and CSJ, conferences and
journals specific for security do not seem to be the common
venues for MDS publications yet.
VI. Threats to validity
We discuss the threats to validity of this SLR according
to the lessons learned on validity in SLRs [77] and our own
experience.
A. The search process
To maximise the relevant articles returned by the search
engines, we kept the search string not too specific but still
reflecting what we wanted to search for. Moreover, the search
string was used for searching not only in the titles, abstracts
but also in the full text of an article. Only the search engine
of Web of Knowledge (ISI) does not provide the option for
searching in full text. This limitation could affect the search
results returned by ISI. To minimise the possibility of missing
relevant papers, we kept our search string generic so that
we cover as many relevant papers as possible (more than
10 thousands relevant papers found). To complement for the
automatic search, we have also conducted the manual search
on relevant journals and proceedings of relevant conferences.
Then, to mitigate the limitations of automatic and manual
searches, we have adopted the snowballing strategy. Even
though only three out of five steps of the snowballing strategy
were adopted, those are the key steps. Moreover, we already
conducted the extensive automatic and manual searches which
covered thousands of relevant publications, and resulted in a
large set of primary MDS papers. That is why conducting only
three key steps of snowballing strategy would be fair enough.
Another possible threat is that we did not extensively search
for books related to MDS. However, we did include the option
to also search for book chapters while performing automatic
search. In fact, we found out some book chapters that got into
our final selected papers for data extraction, e.g. [54], [64].
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B. Selection of primary studies
A large part of the search and selection process was con-
ducted by the first author. Some publications might have been
missed. To mitigate this risk, every doubtful or ”borderline”
publication was not dismissed in the first place but rather being
cross-checked and discussed by all the reviewers. Additionally,
our clearly predefined review protocol with inclusion and
exclusion criteria helped to reduce the reviewers’ bias in the
selection of primary studies.
The results of this SLR papers are based on the data
extracted and synthesised from the selected MDS studies.
Note that we have applied the citation criterion to estimate
the quality and impact factors of the selected primary MDS
studies. Even though this criterion is not too strict, applying
it caused a number of MDS papers not to be included. We
realized that some of the excluded MDS papers are related
to the included primary MDS studies. To mitigate the risk
of missing some important data of the primary MDS studies,
we put back the excluded MDS papers that are related to the
primary MDS studies. In total, we re-selected 15 MDS papers
as the ”sidekick” papers to be included in the final set for data
extraction.
Some key selection criteria in this SLR are time-bound. The
citation criterion for selecting primary MDS papers is based on
the numbers of citations provided by Google Scholar engine.
The selection of venues for conducting manual search is based
on Microsoft Research ranking website. Google citations will
change from time to time. Similarly, rankings of conferences
and journals will change. Those time-bound metrics influence
the reproduction of this SLR. So, some papers which were
not selected as primary MDS papers because of the citation
criterion would satisfy this criterion later on.
VII. Related work
In [71], the authors present a survey on MDS. They propose
an evaluation based on the work of Khwaja and Urban [73].
The study revealed that approaches that analyse implementa-
tions of modelled systems are still missing. Due to the fact that
implementations are not generated automatically from formal
specifications, verification of running code is reasonable. The
main drawback of [71] is that it is not a SLR. As a result, there
are some well-known approaches that are missing in [71], such
as SecureUML [18].
In [13], Basin et al. went through a “Decade of Model-
Driven Security” by presenting a survey focusing on their
specific MDS approach called SecureUML. The authors claim
that MDS has enormous potential, mainly because Security-
Design Models provide a clear, declarative, high-level lan-
guage for specifying security details. The potential is even
more, when the security models rely on a well-defined se-
mantics. The main drawback of [13] is that it only considers
the work around SecureUML.
[121] is a survey of model-based security methodolo-
gies for distributed systems. The papers surveyed in [121]
are not only about model-driven methodologies but also
architecture-driven methodologies, pattern-driven methodolo-
gies, and agent-driven methodologies. Thus the focus is not
specifically MDS but rather security engineering for dis-
tributed systems in general. Our paper explicitly targets MDS
methodologies as described in the previous sections.
In [79], five well-known MDS approaches, i.e. UMLsec,
SecureUML, Sectet, ModelSec, and SecureMDD, are sum-
marised, evaluated, and discussed. These five MDS approaches
are also confirmed in this paper. It can be seen that our SLR
results are complementary to the contributions of the normal
survey papers, e.g. [79], [121]. Those survey papers perform
in depth analysis of some significant MDS approaches by
elaborating one after another. But our SLR performs a SLR in
both width and depth of MDS research which result in not only
(evidently) significant MDS approaches but also emerging
considerable MDS approaches. It is the first MDS literature
review that systematically considers all relevant publications
using explicit evaluation and extraction criteria. Furthermore,
our SLR provides a detailed look at all the key artefacts of any
MDS approaches such as modelling techniques, security con-
cerns, how model transformations employed, how verification
and validation methods used, and case studies, and application
domains. We also provide a trend analysis for the development
of MDS research area.
[62] is closer to our SLR. The authors propose three
research questions with the goal to determine if the current
MDS approaches focus on code generation or having empirical
studies. The study shows that there is a need for more
empirical studies on MDS (none exists), and that standardi-
sation is key to achieve the objectives of MDD/MDS (which
are increased portability and interoperability). However, [62]
presents several drawbacks and differences from our paper.
First, their search strategy is very limited compared to our
three-pronged search strategy. Second, concerning the SLR
protocol, no evaluation criteria and data extraction strategy
are given. Moreover, their exclusion criteria are very narrow.
Consequently, the authors exclude significant papers in the
field, e.g. UMLsec papers. Also, the authors exclude AOM
approaches, because they consider that AOM does not consider
security aspects as specific aspects (i.e. different from other
aspects). Our work covers all the limitations of [62] and
provides much more extensive SLR on the topic.
VIII. Conclusions
We have presented an extensive systematic literature review
on model-driven approaches for developing secure systems.
The SLR is based on a rigorous three-pronged search process,
which combined automatic search and manual search with
snowballing strategy. Using 9 clearly predefined selection
criteria, 108 MDS papers have been strictly selected, and then
reviewed. From these primary MDS papers, we extracted and
synthesised the data to answer our research questions.
The results show that most MDS approaches focus on
authorisation and confidentiality while only few publications
address further security concerns like integrity, availability,
and authentication. Moreover, security concerns are often dealt
with separately. Very few MDS approaches tackle multiple
security concerns simultaneously, systematically. Not only
multiple security concerns are less tackled, but also the inter-
relations among security concerns are rarely taken into account
systematically in MDS approaches. All these findings urge for
more attention from the MDS research community to the less
tackled security concerns, to the solutions that can deal with
multiple security concerns simultaneously, systematically.
Most of the approaches try to separate security concerns
from core business logic, but only few weave security aspects
into primary models. The UML profile mechanism is often
used for the definition of security-oriented DSLs, but some
approaches have introduced non-UML based DSLs. It can be
understandable that standardised, common UML models are
broadly used by MDS approaches. Anyway, defining DSLs
plays a key role in MDS because that way allows better
capturing the specific semantics of security concerns. Still few
security modelling languages are introduced with a thorough
semantic foundation, which is needed for automated formal
analyses. Most of the MDS papers use only structural models.
Using solely one type of models could not be enough to be
able to express multiple security concerns simultaneously.
MMTs and MTTs are important in any MDE approach. In
MDS, MMTs and MTTs are often used but implementation
details and tools are not often provided. Many examined MDS
papers do not specifically provide any implementation infor-
mation about MMTs. These papers just provide mapping rules
for transforming models, or even without clearly defined trans-
formation rules/mappings. Among the transformation tools
provided or mentioned, not only general-purpose MMT and
MTT tools but also many ad-hoc, specific (Java-based) tools
are used. Developing tool chains (based on MMTs and MTTs)
to derive from models to implementation code is an important
piece of future work. Few complete tool chains to automate
(most of) the MDS development process have emerged, but
are very rare. Most approaches discuss illustrative examples or
academic case studies but lack in-depth evaluations, e.g. using
common benchmarks or empirical studies. Altogether, our
literature review shows that many MDS approaches are suc-
cessful for specific, isolated security concerns or application
domains, but lack formality, automation, process-integration
and evaluation.
In our review, we have identified 5 principal MDS studies
which seem more mature than the others. On the other hand,
there are also other emerging/less common MDS approaches
that we have found out. Another important finding comes from
the trend analysis on the key artefacts of MDS over more than
a decade. We can see that there was a peak time of MDS
publications in 2009. After that, the trend of primary MDS
publications looks more stable. The IST journal and MODELS
conference are so far the most popular venues for publication
of MDS papers.
Our SLR protocol and the list of finally selected MDS
papers could be used as the base for a follow-up SLR of MDS
in the future. A reviewer would need to check again the cita-
tion criterion for those primary MDS papers using up-to-date
citation numbers on Google Scholar. After obtaining a subset
of MDS papers from the original set, a forward snowballing
on that subset should be conducted. Only forward snowballing
is required in this step because new, extra MDS papers will
only be found in this way. After reviewing and selecting a
new set of MDS papers from the forward snowballing step,
the full snowballing process can be operated on the new set.
The finally newly found MDS papers after snowballing will
be included into the base subset to form a new final set for
data extraction, synthesis, and analysis.
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